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Abstract 
The article focuses on one of the most significant conceptual reassessments that 
are necessary in order to adapt the idea of sovereignty to the demands of an open 
and democratic society in an ever more interconnected world. Indeed, if 
sovereigns have to reject their absolutistic claim, this implies that they will have 
to share power with other national as well as infra- and supranational or 
international instances. This means that the concept of sovereignty has to be 
relocated within a pluralistic – or better, post-unitary – legal system. Following 
this premise, the article analyses the epistemological presuppositions that stay 
behind the transition from the unitary conception of order to the view that also a 
multiplicity of orders should not be denounced as a pathology any longer, but 
accepted as a fact, on the one hand, and as a desirable perspective on the other. 
The first step of the analysis consists in introducing the fundamental elements of 
the unitary conception of order in both its variants: the particularistic and the 
holistic. In the further section, three approaches are sketched which overcome the 
unitary notion of order: systems theory, post-modernism, and discourse theory. 
Each of these epistemological approaches lays the ground for a specific notion of 
post-unitary legal order: the idea of the existence of a multiplicity of self-reliant, 
albeit not mutually indifferent, legal systems in the first case, legal pluralism in 
the second, and cosmopolitan constitutionalism in the third. 
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A. Introduction: From Unitary to Post-unitary Understanding of Social, 
Political and Legal Order 
 
The reshaping of sovereignty in order to meet the requirements of an open and 
democratic society in an ever more interconnected world needs at least three 
major conceptual reassessments. First, the legitimacy of sovereign power has to 
be conceived “bottom up”, i.e. as an ascending process originating from the 
citizens. Second, the rationalities that sovereign powers display while acting, have 
to be scrutinized so as to find out which understanding of rationality is more 
suitable for making sovereigns aware of their responsibilities towards non-
citizens.
1
 Third, if sovereigns have to reject their absolutistic claim, this implies 
that they will have to share power with other national as well as infra- and 
supranational or international instances. Put differently, if we abandon “the 
conviction that one system of norms [constitutional or international] is superior to 
the other”2 and plea for the ”discordant parity” of a “robust constitutionalism” and 
a “robust internationalism”,3 the concept of sovereignty has to be relocated within 
a pluralistic – or better, post-unitary – legal system. 
 
Yet, the transition from a unitary to a post-unitary understanding of the law is far 
from being an easy task. Indeed, since the beginning of Western thought, social, 
political and legal order has always been conceived of as depending on the unity, 
internal coherence, reliable hierarchy and often also homogeneity of the 
community taken into consideration as the basis for social interaction. Therefore, 
regardless of its extension – it could be as small as the Greek polis, or as huge as 
the Roman Empire, as exclusive as the nation state, or as inclusive as the 
cosmopolitan civitas maxima –, the community regarded as the foundation of 
well-ordered social relations had always to be characterized by a pyramidal 
structure of political institutions and legal norms. The simultaneous presence of 
                                                           
1
 I have presented both these conceptual reassessments in: Sergio Dellavalle, On Sovereignty, 
Legitimacy, and Solidarity. Or: How Can a Solidaristic Idea of Legitimate Sovereignty Be 
Justified? (2015), 11 Theoretical Inquiries in Law (forthcoming). 
2
 Eyal Benvenisti and Alon Harel, Embracing the Tension between National and International 
Human Rights Law: The Case for Parity, GlobalTrust Working Paper 04/2015, 
http://globaltrust.tau.ac.il/publications, at 2.  
3
 Id., at 4. 
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different normative and institutional orders within the same territory, thus, was 
not welcome as the establishment and recognition of diversity, but rather 
condemned as sheer dis-order. In the last decades, yet, a new approach to the 
understanding of legal and political order has been developed, in which the 
plurality of norms and institutions within the same territory and regulating the 
same matter is not denounced as a pathology any longer, but is accepted as a fact, 
on the one hand, and as a desirable perspective on the other.  
 
In my contribution, I will not present this change of perspective as the result of a 
kind of incremental growth of the scope of social interactions, due to the collapse 
of former geo-political divisions and to the development of new communication 
and transport technologies. Nor will I interpret it only as the quasi-natural effect 
of the necessity to support the expanded range of social interaction with an 
adequate normative framework. Rather, I will describe the shift – quite unusually 
within the debate about the emergence of cosmopolitan constitutionalism and 
pluralism in legal doctrine – as the consequence of an epistemological revolution. 
The assumption is that our understanding of the phenomenon of social, political 
and legal order as well as our possibility to act according to the rules of the order 
recognized as valid is fundamentally based, like any other aspect of the use of 
theoretical and practical reason, on epistemological paradigms.
4
 Paradigms are 
those conceptual preconditions of knowledge and action that characterize the use 
of theoretical and practical reason within a certain society and with regard to a 
specific field of human experience and behaviour. On such a kind of fundamental 
paradigms are grounded the theories that attempt to explain the world phenomena 
and to give us orientation for conduct – and insofar as the paradigms on which 
they are based are essentially different, also the theories of knowledge and action 
will contain divergent interpretations of the world and radically distinct normative 
references for praxis. In any case, we cannot reach results in knowledge or action 
which are outside the conceptual scope of the paradigm on which we build our use 
of reason: everything beyond this range is simply not conceivable for us – at least 
at this precise moment of the development of human capabilities. Only a 
                                                           
4
 T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1963). 
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paradigmatic revolution, as a consequence of the adaptation of the theoretical and 
practical presuppositions to inputs coming from experience and praxis which 
cannot be successfully inserted into existing patterns, can make us aware of new 
perspectives. 
 
Every discipline has its specific paradigms; so does also the discipline that we can 
call the “general theory of order”.5 Against this background, the contribution will 
portray the epistemological presuppositions that stay behind the transition from 
the unitary conception of order to the view that also a multiplicity of orders or a 
multilayer understanding of its structure within one and the same society – in this 
case: within the international community – can nevertheless be interpreted as a 
status of order, albeit of a quite different kind.  
 
The first step of the analysis will consist, therefore, in introducing the 
fundamental elements of the unitary conception of order in both its variants: 
particularistic and universalistic (B.). In the further section (C.) I will sketch the 
three main ways of overcoming the unitary notion of order that have been 
developed in the last decades, opening a new horizon on how we think that a 
society is factually shaped or should be, for those authors who endorse a 
normative point of view, rightly organized: systems theory (C.I.), post-modernism 
(C.II.), and discourse theory (C.III.). Each of these epistemological modi operandi 
– which correspond to different forms of criticism against the understanding of 
rationality that dominated modern philosophy – is not only characterized by a 
specific approach to the practical and theoretical use of reason but also lays the 
ground for a particular notion of post-unitary legal order: the idea of the existence 
of a multiplicity of self-reliant, albeit not mutually indifferent, legal systems in the 
first case, legal pluralism in the second, and cosmopolitan constitutionalism in the 
third. 
 
B. Particularism and Universalism in the Unitary Theories of Order  
                                                           
5
 A. von Bogdandy/S. Dellavalle, Universalism Renewed. Habermas’ Theory of International 
Order in Light of Competing Paradigms, 10/1 German Law Journal 5 (2009); S. Dellavalle, Dalla 
comunità particolare all’ordine universale. Vol. I: I paradigmi storici (2011). 
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The assumption that political and legal order should always be unitary, 
hierarchical and self-coherent does not say anything, yet, on the question 
concerning the extension of the well-ordered society. In principle, two opposite 
answers are possible. The first one asserts that order – that means: a system of 
social interactions that prevents the disruptive effects of conflicts by neutralizing 
them through the procedural application of social and legal rules – is always 
limited to the internal context of every specific society and thus particular. On 
contrast, in the external dimension, i.e. between different societies, just a 
precarious and temporary control of disorder can be achieved. Thus, according to 
the particularistic conception, every society has its own social and legal order, but 
no supra-state or cosmopolitan order is possible. As a result, a plurality of national 
orders is supposed to exist, but no legal pluralism – in the sense of the co-
existence of legal norms applicable to the same matter, but derived from different 
sources, which are not hierarchically related to each other – is regarded as 
possible or desirable. A “pluriversum” is here, thus, conceivable and admitted, but 
one that is made of non-pluralist orders (B.I). 
 
The second answer to the question of the extension of social order maintains, to 
the contrary, that the well-ordered society can comprehend, at least in principle, 
the whole humankind, assuming therefore a universalistic scope. The apotheosis 
of this conception can be located in Hans Kelsen’s monistic theory of the legal 
system. Beyond any parochialism, the unitary vision of the legal system – and 
therefore the rejection of legal pluralism – is here expanded in cosmopolitan 
perspective. The consequence is that pluralism is excluded – even more radically 
than in the particularistic understanding – also from international law, which is 
thus transformed into a rigid structure of hierarchically disposed norms. Drawing 
from its high intellectual ambitions, Kelsen’s legal philosophy is an outstanding 
example of how the condemnation of the disorder of plurality is derived from 
assumptions – not always perfectly transparent for lawyers without philosophical 
background – concerning the necessary fundaments of true knowledge as well as 
of right action (B.II.). 
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I. A Pluriversum of Non-pluralist Orders  
 
Generally, the core element of the particularistic conception of the unitary legal 
order – according to which rules of peaceful interaction, and therefore of a well-
ordered society, can be reliably applied, provided for the due differences, only 
within each political community but not to the relations between polities – 
consists in the concept of the essential sovereignty of the individual political 
community. However, the contents of this concept can be quite diverging. 
Specifically, two variants can be distinguished. 
 
1. The first strand of the particularistic understanding of the unitary theories of 
legal order is centred on the idea of national identity. According to this approach, 
developed in particular by prestigious German constitutionalists like Josef 
Isensee, Paul Kirchhof and Dieter Grimm, only the unity of the legal system, 
grounded on the primacy of the national constitution, can guarantee the rule of 
law and a high standard of legitimacy, both of which would be lost in the context 
of a cosmopolitan turn of constitutionalism.
6
 More concretely, the unity of the 
law
7
 is based on the unity of public power
8
 – and this, for its part, can only be the 
result of the national unity of the people (Volk).
9
 Interesting are here, above all, 
the reasons of the unity of the people: Isensee identifies them with “geographic 
and geopolitical situation, historic origin and experience, cultural specificity, 
economic necessities of the people, natural and political conditions.”10 None of 
these elements can be regarded as the consequence of free decisions taken by the 
members of the political community. To the contrary, all of them are expressions 
of a pre-political state of facts, of a quasi-natural condition of the Volk, on which 
political and legal institutions are built. They constitute the Volk, thus, as a 
                                                           
6
 D. Grimm, The Constitution in the Process of Denationalization, 12 Constellations 447 (2005). 
7
 J. Isensee, Staat und Verfassung, in: J. Isensee and Paul Kirchhof (eds.), Handbuch des 
Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band I: Grundlagen von Staat und Verfassung, 591, 
at 619 (1987). 
8
 Id., at 620. 
9
 Id., at 634. 
10
 Id. 
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“community of destiny”,11 before and beyond any individual decision or 
preference.
12
 Furthermore, since the existential conditions of the Volk are unitary, 
the legal system that guarantees a peaceful interaction among the members of the 
Volk will be unitary as well. 
 
Whereas in Isensee’s and Kirchhof’s interpretation the unity of the Volk has a 
generally ethnic character, where ethnic identity is understood as comprehending 
a large number of mostly pre-communicative elements, Dieter Grimm locates it 
rather in the common language spoken by all members of the people.
13
 Only the 
existence of a shared language – following Grimm – enables the members of the 
political community to legitimate the institutions of public power as well as their 
decisions.
14
 Here lies the key to a better understanding of the concept of 
rationality generally adopted by the supporters of the nation-based strand of legal 
theory. Correctly, law is identified as fundamentally linked to linguistic 
communication.
15
 Linguistic communication, however, is not defined on 
principles of transcendental pragmatics,
16
 but on the specific identity of national 
languages. For that reason, language can never be universal; rather, we have – 
according to this approach – a “pluriversum” of languages, each of them specific 
for a particular cultural community, i.e. for a nation. Moreover, if the rationality is 
necessarily embedded in language, and the language is no less necessarily the 
language of a nation, rationality itself will be deeply linked to the “spirit” of a 
nation. In other words, if we do not admit any universal language on which 
rationality is grounded, we will not have any universal rationality either. The 
plurality of languages and national identities justifies the plurality of legal systems 
as well, but each of these systems of norms builds a coherent and hierarchical 
unity in itself, clearly separated from any other legal system – like any national 
identity is inevitably separated from all other national identities. Here the 
                                                           
11
 Id. 
12
 P. Kirchhof, Der deutsche Staat im Prozess der europäischen Integration, in: Isensee/Kirchhof 
(note 7), at 869. 
13
 D. Grimm, Braucht Europa eine Verfasssung?, 50 JuristenZeitung 581 (1995). 
14
 Id., at 588. 
15
 For an analysis of the relationship between law and language, see: S. Dellavalle, Das Recht als 
positiv formalisierte Sprache des gesellschaftlich verbindlichen Sollens, in: C. Bäcker, M. Klatt 
and S. Zucca-Soest (eds.), Sprache – Recht – Gesellschaft, at 93 (2012). 
16
 K.-O. Apel, Transformation der Philosophie (1973). 
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ascertainment of the irreducible presence of plurality does not lead, anyway, to the 
recognition of legal pluralism as the condition in which different systems of 
norms dialogically coexist with reference to the same matter and within the same 
context. 
 
2. The idea that the unity of the law derives from the unity of public power, 
centred on sovereignty, is shared also by the second strand of the particularistic 
understanding of the unitary theories of legal order.
17
 Common as well is the 
conviction that public law should maintain an incontestable primacy over all other 
domains of the law in order to guarantee the hierarchical coherence of the whole 
legal system. Different is, however, the ontological and epistemological 
foundation of the centrality of public law, in general, and of constitutional law in 
particular. According to this second interpretation – and specifically to Martin 
Loughlin as one of its most prominent advocates within the contemporary legal 
theory – the centrality of public law is not due primarily to the fact that it would 
translate into legal terms the quasi-natural, pre-political identity of the “nation”, 
but is drawn from the persuasion that public law expresses, quite to the contrary, 
the highly political will of an autonomous entity that constitutes itself precisely 
through this act.
18
 In other words, the public sphere – organized by the system of 
norms of public law – has its origin in the apodictic assertion of will made by a 
sovereign social actor, firmly rooted in the factual terrain of power.
19
 No 
precondition such as the cultural or ethnic identity of the nation is here required to 
the political act of will, and this can be accomplished by as different social and 
ideological subjects as Bodin’s monarch,20 Carl Schmitt’s Volk,21 or Sieyès’ 
pouvoir constituant.
22
 The only indispensable requisite is that the act of will has to 
be free, i.e. independent from any other source of power.
23
  
 
                                                           
17
 M. Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (2010), at 50. 
18
 Id. , at 208, 221, 228 and 231. 
19
 Id., at 216. 
20
 For Loughlin’s analysis of Bodin’s political philosophy, see: id., at 185. 
21
 Id., at 209. 
22
 Id., at 221. 
23
 Id., at 209. 
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According to this second, rather power-related understanding of the unity of the 
legal system, the rationality of public law consists in the simple affirmative 
assertion made by the individual entity. Rationality develops through apodictic 
propositions centred on the first-person pronoun, implies the effectiveness of 
decisions by relying on sufficient power resources, and lastly excludes internal 
diversity since the act of will, in this conception, has always to be self-coherent 
and to avoid contradictions. In this sense, if the public power takes the decision A, 
the possibility of non-A has always to be kept out from the domain on which this 
individual public power exercises sovereignty and in which the decision A is 
accepted as legally valid. Nonetheless, public power founded on a particularistic 
act of will does not rule out the existence of other sovereign public powers: 
simply, the domains in which they exercise authority should not overlap. 
 
II. Hans Kelsen’s Monism, or the Rejection of Legal Pluralism as the 
Apotheosis of the Legal Theory of Modern Subjectivism 
 
Whereas the unitary conception of the legal system finds its limits, within the 
particularistic approach, at the boundaries of the individual political communities, 
in universalistic perspective no limitation is set. As a result, the whole 
cosmopolitan human society can and should be ruled on the basis of a self-
coherent and hierarchical pyramid of norms. The extension of the well-ordered 
community is acquired, however, at the cost of an even more radical removal of 
diversity: even that pluralism
24
 which, in the pluriversum of non-pluralist orders, 
was possible at least with regard to the many different national legal systems, is 
here dismissed on a cosmopolitan scale. No other author has championed this 
position better and with higher theoretical ambition than Hans Kelsen. 
 
                                                           
24
 I understand “diversity” as the presence, within the same context and regardless of how large 
this may be, of different systems of norms. “Pluralism” is here used as the concept that describes 
the acceptance and recognition of the positive value of diversity. Open remains the question as to 
whether pluralism can and should be achieved on the basis of an overarching rationality made able 
to include diversity – like in the communicative paradigm of social order (see infra, C.III.) – or by 
rejecting any attempt to establish a universally valid rationality – like in systems theory (see infra 
C.I.) and postmodern thought (see infra C.II.). 
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Kelsen’s reasons for his rejection of legal pluralism25 can be drawn from his 
analysis of the contraposition between dualism and monism.
26
 His starting point is 
what he maintains to be a paradox: paradoxical indeed is the claim put forward by 
the supporters of nationalism, according to which a nation state pretends to be 
sovereign though acknowledging the validity of international law. In fact – Kelsen 
argues – the condition of sovereignty is realized when no power needs to be 
recognized, factually and normatively, as situated above oneself, so that the own 
capability of acting is not limited by any heterarchic instance.
27
 Yet, international 
law – if taken seriously – imposes precisely such a limitation.28 For that reason, 
either the nation state is not sovereign, or international law has little, if any, 
normative quality. 
 
Kelsen detects three possible ways for resolving the paradox – the first one basing 
on a dualistic interpretation of the legal system, the second and third ones on a 
monistic view. The dualistic solution assumes that two different legal systems – 
the national and the international – coexist, the first one providing rules for the 
domestic realm, the second for the relations between states. According to this 
perspective, each system has its own basis of legitimacy and is unchallenged in its 
area of competence.
29
 The problem, following Kelsen, is that in this case we 
would possibly have two diverging norms, derived from two different legal 
systems, both effective and legitimate, which simultaneously apply to the same 
matter. Kelsen refuses this possibility and points out unambiguously that the 
simultaneous validity of two diverging norms leads to a contradiction which 
would jeopardize the normative quality of the entire legal system.
30
 Therefore, in 
his view the existence of a plurality of norms – that means: the presence of more 
                                                           
25
 It must be underlined, here, that the pluralism rejected by Kelsen is not the ethical, religious, 
ideological, political or philosophical pluralism, but only – which is nevertheless central for the 
present analysis – the legal and institutional pluralism, that means the recognition that the 
presence, within the same territory, of a plurality of non-hierarchically organized institutions 
vested with political authority may be seen, under certain circumstances, as an added value. 
26
 H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre. Einleitung in die rechtswissenschaftliche  Problematik (1934), at 
140. 
27
 H. Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts (1981; 1
st
 ed. 1928), 
at 12. 
28
 Id., at 40. 
29
 Id., at 102. 
30
 H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (1949; 1
st
 ed. 1945), at 363. 
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than one rule applicable at the same time to the same legal field – is completely 
inacceptable: a pathology of disorder that should be avoided, or, if already 
present, healed as soon as possible. 
 
In order to understand better on which epistemological assumptions Kelsen’s 
rejection of plurality is based, it is necessary to consider first the further solutions 
he proposes. Both are grounded on a monistic conception of the legal system, i. e. 
on the assumption that domestic and international law have one and the same 
foundation for validity and legitimacy. The difference is that in the first case 
domestic public law prevails on international law, whilst in the second 
international law is placed at the top of the pyramid of legal norms. Following the 
first definition of monism, international law is conceived of as a part of domestic 
public law, or, as it has been described, as “external state law”.31 Therefore, it is 
among the competences of the sovereign individual state to specify the scope of 
international legal norms. The curious – and according to Kelsen even quite 
absurd – consequence of this modus operandi is that, given the fact that we have a 
large number of individual states, if international law is depending for the 
specification of its normative range on sovereign decisions taken by each of those 
single states, we will also have as many different international law systems as we 
have sovereign states; that means, lastly, that no binding international law would 
exist. Not less absurd would be the circumstance that, since international law 
norms provide for the mutual recognition of states as equal actors on the 
international arena, exactly this mutual acknowledgment, which is fundamental 
for the very functioning of the international system, should rely upon the free and 
arbitrary will of each individual states. The result would be that the recognition of 
every state as equal actor of international law would lie in the hands of every 
other single state, as well as that each individual state would decide on the 
international recognition of all other states – a confusing condition, which is 
illogical on the one hand, and would not contribute to stability in international 
relations on the other.
32
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 Kelsen (note 26), at 140. 
32
 Id., at 142. 
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The only solution of the problem would thus consist indeed, if we follow Kelsen 
and accept his conceptual presuppositions, in the preference for the monistic 
structure of the entire legal system, but turned upside down as against the former 
option, i. e. with international law at the apex of the pyramid and domestic public 
law as the executor of the fundamental principles and norms of international law 
within a limited territory, towards a specific group of individuals – the citizens of 
the state – and within the range of competences attributed to the state by 
international norms.
33
 Kelsen admits explicitly that such a construction of the 
legal system would mark the end of any serious pretension of sovereignty by the 
single states.
34
  
 
No doubt can be raised on intellectual courage and originality of Kelsen’s 
conception: his turn from an international law conceived as subordinated to 
domestic law to the assertion of its pre-eminence, based on an outstandingly 
ambitious conceptual framework, is one of the most fascinating and pathbreaking 
moves ever made by legal thinking. Nevertheless, it is not free from problems. In 
particular, the strictly hierarchical and rigid structure of the system of the law as a 
whole favoured by Kelsen, along with his harsh refusal of legal pluralism, 
condemned as a source of confusion and disorder, appears to be ill-equipped to 
face properly the challenges with which the legal system is confronted at the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century. In a context of increasingly complex and 
differentiated interactions, the multiple facets of law can hardly be correctly 
understood and further developed if forced to fit into a traditional pyramidal 
hierarchy of norms.  
 
The question that we should pose now is why Kelsen so rigorously rejected the 
perspective of a non-monistic legal order, thus constraining legal norms into a 
limiting and lastly short-sighted ranked structure. Surely, he cannot be made 
responsible for not being aware of social, economic and legal developments which 
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 Id., at 149; H. Kelsen, Peace through Law (1944), at 35. 
34
 Kelsen (note 26), at 142 and 153. 
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were, in his times, yet to come. Striking is, nevertheless, that his conception of the 
structure of the legal system does not need just an adjustment to be made fit for a 
useful application in our times; rather it is, in particular as regards its theoretical 
presuppositions and framework, completely inadequate for this purpose. We can 
detect the reason for this deep-rooted shortcoming of a nonetheless exceptional 
achievement in legal philosophy if we consider his theory of the hierarchy of legal 
norms as the apotheosis, within the field of legal philosophy, of the understanding 
of knowledge and action that dominated Western thought from the middle of the 
17
th
 until the beginning of the 20
th
 century. According to the philosophy first 
outlined by Descartes
35
 and then further developed by almost all greatest Western 
thinkers until Sigmund Freud
36
 and the early Wittgenstein,
37
 knowledge and 
action are not based on a natural or divine order, but on the cognitive capacities of 
the individual subject. In what has been called “modern subjectivism” the social 
and intersubjective rootedness of individuals plays no significant role, and the 
theoretical and practical use of reason is based exclusively on the correct use by 
every single individual of his/her mental capabilities, lastly regardless of any 
interaction with other human beings. For modern philosophy, knowledge is true 
and action is right if the individuals – each of them for her- or himself – perform 
the correct mental processes and insert the elements of experience into an 
internally coherent und unitary framework of categories. True knowledge and 
right action are thus grounded on the unity, internal coherence and hierarchy of 
the mental processes of the subject. Within the ranked order of modern 
subjectivism, categories organize empirical experience
38
 and higher duties and 
values have to exercise control over physical impulses.
39
 Analogously, in Kelsen’s 
legal system higher norms exercise control over lower ones, and the whole 
structure is theoretically sound only if it is organized as a translation of the 
principles of modern philosophy into the language of the law, i. e. as a closed, 
pyramidal and internally coherent system of norms. However, if this is the 
                                                           
35
 R. Descartes, Discours de la Méthode (1637); R. Descartes, Meditationes de Prima Philosophia 
(1642); R. Descartes, Principia philosophiae (1644). 
36
 S. Freud, Das Ich und das Es (1923); S. Freud, Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (1930). 
37
 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921). 
38
 I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781). 
39
 B. Spinoza, Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata (1677). 
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condition for a legal system to be sound, no order of pluralism can be admitted, at 
least not in the legal and institutional setting, and no opening can be made – or 
even is, from the theoretical point of view, thinkable – towards a poliarchic 
understanding of legal rules. To reach this new field, a paradigmatic revolution 
was thus needed. 
 
C. Towards a Paradigmatic Revolution: The Post-unitary Theories of Order 
 
From an epistemological point of view, all unitary conceptions of legal order 
share what we could call an exclusive understanding of rationality, in the sense 
that the idea of rationality that they apply is fundamentally characterized by the 
exclusion of diversity. So expels the rationality grounded on national languages 
the principle of diversity insofar as this is located outside the borders of the 
culturally-based, self-subsistent community: if diversity exists, this is referred to 
the plurality of cultural identities, but is largely banished from the internal unity of 
each of them.  
 
No less exclusive is the concept of rationality founded on power. In principle, the 
rationality expressed in the individual act of will is potentially universal – in 
contrast to the nation-based conception – insofar as the supporters of the power-
based approach to legal theory generally assume that this kind of use of reason is 
shared by all social and political actors. Yet, the solipsistic assertion of will, even 
if we admit that it represents a common use of reason, is characterized 
nevertheless by indifference, if not by hostility, towards any other affirmation of 
individual will. The many individual sources of acts of will behave in a similar 
way and use the reason in an analogous manner, but they interact only 
strategically. Therefore, diversity is, in the best case, tolerated – or, somehow, 
even recognized – as something external, which should not interfere with the own 
will, and is never included in a dialogue searching for an overlapping basis for a 
more-than-strategic ethical, political and juridical discourse. 
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With the turn to cosmopolitanism in political philosophy and legal theory the 
inclusion of diversity seems to be, at first glance, inevitable: how could a cosmos 
comprehending the universal human society be conceived, if not as one accepting 
the plurality of legal orders in its scope? Yet, Kelsen’s cosmopolitanism shows us 
that the idea of a universal legal order can go along with the refusal of diversity. 
This can happen if the rationality that is applied depicts universality just as a 
blowing up of the individual subjectivity. The solipsistic, non-dialogical use of 
reason that, in the particularistic understanding of the unitary idea of order, was 
embodied in the individuality of the nation or of the pouvoir constituant grows 
here to a global macro-anthropos aiming to shape a legal order for the whole 
humankind. This way, horizontal diversity degenerates into vertical 
differentiation, brought under control by a hierarchical concept of reason. 
 
To conceive of the legal system as a pluralist order that acknowledges diversity as 
an added value, a new understanding of rationality had to be developed which had 
to overcome the modern identification of order, truth and right action with unity, 
hierarchy and internal consistency. Three major theoretical approaches which 
undertook this challenge have been elaborated since the last decades of the 20
th
 
century, the first centred on the plurality of functional rationalities, the second on 
the destructuration of the unitary character of modern subjectivism, and the third 
on a dialogical reinterpretation of reason. 
 
I. Systems Theory, or the Plurality of Functional Rationalities 
 
The theory of society elaborated by Niklas Luhmann eschews any reference to an 
overarching rationality that, starting from the transcendental capacities of the 
individuals, would pretend to encompass, like in modern philosophy, all forms of 
social interaction. No universal reason – subjective or intersubjective – is here 
envisaged, either at the descriptive or at the prescriptive level.
40
 To the contrary, 
Luhmann maintains that many rationalities can be observed by the social scientist, 
                                                           
40
 N. Luhmann, Soziale Systeme. Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie (1984); N. Luhmann, Das 
Recht der Gesellschaft (1993); N. Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (1997). 
16 
 
each of them characterizing the way of functioning of one specific social 
subsystem. In other words, while we do not detect – according to Luhmann’s 
systems theory – any extra-systemic rational processes, we observe the 
implementation of different rational processes that, within the manifold functional 
subsystems of society, guarantee that these subsystems deliver the performances 
for which they have developed and that are necessary for the continuity and the 
further improvement – in the sense of higher efficiency – of the whole society. 
 
Given these premises, also the legal system – as a social subsystem itself – will be 
characterized by its specific rationality. Authors inspired by Luhmann have gone, 
however, even further – in a direction which is very significant for the present 
inquiry. Indeed, since the function of the law consists in stabilizing the normative 
expectations of the actors of social interactions,
41
 and since these social 
expectations derive from a large number of social subsystems in which 
functionally specified social interactions occur, the existence of a plurality of 
social subsystems will correspond to a fragmentation of the legal system on a 
global scale.
42
 Put differently, insofar as the law has the function to guarantee the 
internal order of different social subsystems, the law itself loses its unity and 
develops distinct legal subsystems, each of them characterized by the rationality, 
expressed in legal terms, that underlies the implementation of the subsystemic 
functions.
43
 
 
From the perspective of systems theory, the fragmentation of the law is not, 
therefore, the result of an irrational disorder, but expression of the manifold order 
of plural rationalities.
44
 The problem comes out, here, when collisions emerge 
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between different legal regimes: because systems theory assumes that no 
generally recognized overarching system of law, nor a suprasystemic rationality 
exist to make interaction between actors of distinct legal subsystems possible as 
well as to allow the flow of information between them, the question is how those 
collisions can be dealt with so as to avoid disruptive consequences for the whole 
society.
45
 One of the most central tenets of systems theory claims that social 
subsystems are self-reliant, that means that no actor of one subsystem can operate 
within another subsystem, nor communication generated within a social 
subsystem can directly flow into another subsystem, thus immediately influencing 
its operational chain.
46
 As a consequence of this assumption, each subsystem 
reacts to the “irritations” coming from outside, i.e. from another subsystem, by 
relying on the own rationality and thus by adapting its operational chains to the 
new environmental situation.
47
 Lastly, no common language can be built on 
systemically distinct rationalities. 
 
Many questions arise from this approach. First, from the epistemological point of 
view, the restriction of rationality just to its functional dimension seems to 
impoverish significantly the range of its unfolding. Second, from the empirical 
standpoint, it is at least questionable whether the axiom of the “operative 
closedness” really describes how social communication works. Exactly as regards 
communication within the legal system – or, better, between distinct legal 
subsystems – it has been claimed, on the basis of case studies, that legal 
communication flows largely between the legal subsystems, and not only within 
them, as well as that legal actors, while performing their actions, follow rules 
which are drawn from disparate systemic logics, put together on the basis of their 
individual preferences and purposes.
48
 Third, from the axiological perspective, the 
limitation of the use of reason to the research of the best functional response to the 
“irritations” coming from the environment makes actually any critical approach, 
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supported by reason, to the status quo of society lastly impossible and any hope 
for a better realization of freedom and justice by legal means obsolete. 
 
II. The Postmodern Critique of Modern Subjectivism, or Legal Pluralism as 
the Framework for Dialogue between Incommensurable Identities 
 
The way how systems theory understands the structure of rationality that unfolds 
within social subsystems still reminds us of modern subjectivism: albeit limited to 
its functional dimension, systemic rationality is, like the reason of modern 
subjectivity, monadically self-sufficient, self-reliant, coherent, and hierarchically 
structured. To find a more radical turning away from modern subjectivism, we 
have to move on to the second post-unitary conception of order, i.e. to 
postmodernism. 
 
The explicit target of postmodern criticism is the modern concept of subjectivity, 
accused to be nothing less than an artificial construct imposed to constrain human 
experience and action capabilities into a forced and oppressive unity.
49
 Actual 
human individualities have to realize themselves, therefore, beyond the 
boundaries of a unitary – and lastly tyrannical – idea of order, enforced by a 
diffuse power aiming at the full control over bodies and minds.
50
 However, 
insofar as modern subjectivism was the epistemological guarantee of true 
knowledge and right action as well as of the unity of the systems built respectively 
on the theoretical and the practical use of reason, the overcoming of modern 
subjectivism through postmodern criticism runs also the risk of losing any shared 
criterion as regards the distinction between true and false, as well as between just 
and unjust. Indeed, legal philosophers influenced by postmodern thinking 
generally deny that legal propositions contain a universally recognisable 
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epistemological and ethical content.
51
 Following some interpretations, legal norms 
are simply instruments in the hands of lawyers who pursue their own priorities by 
means of legal arguments.
52
 Complete arbitrariness is here prevented not by 
resorting to a universal rationality – which is thought to be only a chimera, or 
even a vehicle of oppression – but rather by appealing to non-rational attitudes 
largely shared by fellow humans, such as empathy.
53
  
 
Favoured by the postmodern de-construction of the modern idea of unity as the 
best realization of a rational order, other authors have pointed out, on the contrary, 
the inherent plural quality of contemporary law.
54
 Here lies the epistemological 
foundation of the theory of legal pluralism. In the eyes of the supporters of this 
approach, no legal regime can claim to embody the principles of a superior 
rationality. Rather, every legal system is the formal product of a narration that has 
its raison d’être – not less than any other narration – in the conditions of 
interaction of a specific society, cast into the form of legal discourse. From this 
perspective, diversity itself is a value, with the consequence that any attempt by 
allegedly supra-ordered legal norms to force hierarchy on the manifold plurality 
of legal systems is condemned as a suffocation of what is not only a matter of 
fact, but also a normatively desirable opportunity to unfold the freedom of 
individuals and social groups. 
 
The novelty introduced by the approach of legal pluralism into legal theory is 
underlined by Nico Krisch. In his passionate and eloquent plea, pluralism is 
presented as a “break”,55 thus – in epistemological terms – as a paradigmatic 
revolution which overcomes the old-fashioned idea of the unity of the legal 
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system,
56
 paving the way to the acknowledgement of diversity.
57
 National 
constitutionalism is criticized because it “not only fails to include but also fails to 
deliver.”58 As regards the first issue, “domestic constitutionalism, which places 
the national community at the centre of the legal and political universe […] 
cannot reflect [the] broader constituency” that “goes well beyond the national 
community”: therefore, “on transboundary issues, it remains underinclusive.”59 
And, referring to the second point, “domestic constitutionalism […] would require 
us to withdraw from, rather than extend, effective postnational decision-making 
structures in order to safeguard control by domestic political processes.”60 Yet, the 
criticism is broadened to comprehend cosmopolitan or postnational 
constitutionalism as well, insofar as it is accused “to provide continuity with the 
domestic constitutionalist tradition by construing an overarching legal framework 
that determines the relationships of the different levels of law and the distribution 
of power among their institutions.”61 On contrast, pluralism is adaptable and 
enables us to adopt a highly flexible system of checks and balances which can fit 
into the postnational legal system with its poliarchic character.
62
 Last but not least, 
legal pluralism not only defines a theoretical instrument able to describe the 
present state of the art but also depicts what can be regarded as a normatively 
attractive perspective.
63
 
 
The theory of legal pluralism seems to possess an evident advantage over unitary 
conceptions of legal order as well as, at least at first glance, over both other post-
unitary understandings. Indeed, it simply acknowledges the multifaceted 
dimension of the legal phenomenon as it has developed in the contemporary 
world, without trying to impose on it an overarching system of rules, or a criterion 
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for the distinction between rational and non-rational.
64
 Since from the point of 
view of postmodern legal pluralism no universal standard of rationality can be 
convincingly established, every social narration has to be considered as rational as 
any other, and the legal rules that give predictability to the interactions that unfold 
within the societal context of a narration should be recognized as being on an 
equal footing as any other system of law. 
 
Not less evident are however, on the other hand, also the disadvantages that 
emerge from postmodern pluralism. First, whilst in the traditional understanding 
the normativity of a legal norm was clearly related to its position within the 
system of the law as a whole, in a context of plurality in which norms have 
disparate origins, partially incommensurable fields of application and largely 
different instruments of implementation, the normative quality of rules and 
principles is increasingly difficult to define and ascertain.
65
 In front of a weaker 
normative content of the law, the factum brutum of power would become ever 
more central and decisive in social and political interaction.
66
  
 
Second, the basis for legitimacy of the norms against the background of pluralism 
is not only itself plural but also often shaky and characterized by little 
transparency. This happens when the criteria for legitimacy are made independent 
from the main epistemic principle of democracy, according to which those who 
are bound by rules ought to have the chance to participate in the decision-making-
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process that establishes the norms they have to follow.
67
 As a result, legitimacy is 
based on more flexible – if not rather vague – standards.68 However, if 
accountability, revisability and deliberation are not put into a setting of precise 
conditions for participation of all those involved, the door that seems to be open 
for inclusion can be easily closed down when it comes to what really matters, 
namely to decisions.  
 
Third, within the unitary legal system the criteria for interpretation and further 
development of the lex lata were in general firmly established and derived from 
the basic assumptions – forming themselves a unitary whole – of the pyramid of 
the law. To the contrary, pluralist approaches substitute legal and rational 
argumentation as the linguistic tool for interpretation and improvement of the 
existing law – a concept which presupposes the existence of a shared standard for 
the evaluation of the descriptive and prescriptive quality of a legal proposition – 
with contestation – a concept which, instead, actually rejects the possibility that 
common criteria for the search for truth and justice can be found out.
69
  
 
Yet, fourth, if no generally accepted criteria for rational communication can be 
determined – simply because no supra-contextual rationality is meant to exist – 
then the question arises on which language can be used to settle the conflicts that 
emerge between legal orders in a context of pluralism. The supporters of legal 
pluralism have intensively investigated the communicative processes that unfold 
between legal orders;
70
 yet, probably because of a certain indifference to 
epistemological questions, they do not address the problem of how 
communication can work if we do not assume the existence of a shared rational 
basis as the dividing line that separates convincing from non-convincing 
arguments. 
 
                                                           
67
 Id., at 16. 
68
 Id., at 268. 
69
 Id., at 81. 
70
 Fischer-Lescano/Teubner (note 45); Krisch (note 48), at 109. 
23 
 
III. The Communicative Paradigm, or the Attempt to Conciliate the Legacy 
of Modern Rationalism, the Principle of Legitimacy of Democratic 
Constitutionalism, and the Recognition of Plurality 
 
The unitary conception of legal order, based on a philosophically well-elaborated 
and long-established epistemology, had the benefits of a clear definition of 
normativity, a firm basis for legitimacy and a robust criterion for the interpretation 
of the lex lata as well as for the definition of proposals de lege ferenda. On the 
other hand, it had also the deficit of being insensitive to the challenges of a 
multifaceted social world. To the contrary, systems theory and postmodern 
thinking deliver answers to the contemporary questions that affect the legal 
system, but at the cost of a problematic weakening of the normative quality of the 
law as well as of its legitimacy. As a solution, a new concept of rationality should 
be developed that overcomes the hierarchical rigidity of modern subjectivism, 
meeting this way the demands of a pluralist world of social interactions, but still 
maintains the tenets of a universal rationality. The communicative paradigm of 
order may be seen as a significant step forward in this direction.
71
  
 
According to the fundamental assumption of the communicative paradigm, 
society is made of a plurality of interactions, each of them characterized by a 
specific aim that influences decisively the discursive contents of the interaction. 
Yet, although the aim of the social interaction is essential to determine the 
contents of the discourse, the rationality embodied in the communication – mainly 
at the linguistic level, but not only – is, from the perspective of the communicative 
paradigm, not exclusively and even not primarily functional. Rather, the 
communicative rationality – right from the understanding of communication here 
presupposed – has always a normative core.72 Precisely this normative core, even 
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more than the reference to the outer object, is what makes communicative 
rationality universal – and therefore different from the purely systemic 
rationalities.
73
  
 
As regards the legal system, communicative rationality paves the way, from the 
epistemological standpoint, to a conception in which the manifold articulation of 
the legal system is recognized, but in a quite different way than in the approaches 
described before. Here plurality is embedded into an overarching structure, held 
together by the display of communicative reason as a counterpart of systemic 
rationality – a counterpart that is operating not only from outside the social 
subsystems but also inside each of them.
74
 Two characteristics stick out. First, the 
communicative understanding of legal order overcomes the hierarchical notion of 
the legal system which was typical for the traditional conception of order, but 
maintains a normative ranking between the different levels of the system. The 
normative quality of the norm, however, is not justified here by the level of “hard 
power” of which the authority vested with the task to impose this norm over other 
rules can dispose, but rather by the more or less high inclusivity of the range of 
validity of the norm. In this sense, international law has the highest normative 
quality, albeit endowed with relatively little authoritative and compelling “hard 
power”. Second, the recognition of legal differentiation and diversity as a matter 
of fact and as a desirable outlook does not correspond, from the standpoint of the 
communicative paradigm, to a value-free, horizontal pluralism like in the 
perspective of postmodern criticism. Instead, the fundamental values – conveyed 
through the communicative reason – pervade all subsystems and all levels of the 
legal system. As a result, the normative centre of the legal order is held by the 
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principle of democratic legitimation and definition of common interests and 
values, whereby the democratically legitimated public order maintains a 
normative superiority over private law subsystems.   
 
As a post-unitary, non-hierarchical and non-pyramidal whole, the legal system of 
the communicative paradigm takes the form of a constitutionalism beyond the 
borders of the nation state,
75
 the cosmopolitan dimension of which, due to its 
acknowledgment of diversity, is quite different from the old ideas of the “world 
state” or of the civitas maxima. As underlined by Mattias Kumm, cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism overcomes the old-fashioned dichotomy between dualism and 
monism, being situated beyond both of them.
76
 Acknowledging the intrinsic value 
of diversity, it makes the case for pluralism to its own – but in a way which is 
significantly different from the conception presented before. Indeed, cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism “is not monist and allows for the possibility of conflict not 
ultimately resolved by the law, but it insists that common constitutional principles 
provide a framework that allows for the constructive engagement of different sites 
of authority with one another.”77 Even more explicitly, “this results in a 
conception of legality that is not monist in that it allows for legal pluralism: 
potential for legally irresolvable conflict between national and international law 
remains. But it is not simply dualist either: the relationship between national and 
international law is reconceived in light of a common set of principles that play a 
central role in determining the relative authority of each in case of conflict.”78 One 
of the most important consequences for the legal praxis of an improved 
relationship between national and international law within the context of a 
cosmopolitan understanding of constitutionalism is the increasing cooperation 
between national and international courts, in particular in the field of human rights 
protection.
79
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Although not limited any longer by the boundaries of the nation state, 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism largely presupposes the same cognitive frame for 
legitimate authority that characterizes traditional, nation-state-bound 
constitutionalism.
80
 That means that a specific understanding of the social world 
and of the relationship between individuals and political society lies at the core of 
both national and cosmopolitan constitutionalism, regardless of the significant 
differences and of the novelty of the latter outlined above. More explicitly, the 
constitutional cognitive frame comprehends four elements. First, it presupposes “a 
comprehensive framework for all relevant considerations relating to the 
establishment and exercise of legitimate authority that falls within its scope.”81 In 
other words, constitutionalism, even if not unitary and hierarchically organized, 
always maintains the ambition to construe an overarching normative framework 
which prevents the disruptive contents of diversity and makes the dialogue 
between different legal traditions possible by resorting to a cognitive dimension, 
to a conception of rationality that can be worked out as common to them all. 
Second, constitutionalism cannot be reduced to positive law. Third, a 
constitutional cognitive frame “must integrate and structure […] three core 
concerns”: “the exercise of public authority through law”; the generation of “an 
account of legitimate procedures”; the “substantive constraints […] for the 
exercise of public authority, to be fleshed out in terms of human or constitutional 
rights.”82 Fourth – from my point of view the most important feature – the 
constitutional cognitive frame has always to be referred to “the idea of free and 
equal persons.”83  
 
The fourth element of the constitutional cognitive frame resumes quite clearly, in 
the terms of legal and political theory, the principle of the epistemic centrality of 
the active participation in the discursive interaction by all those involved that, 
from a philosophical and epistemological perspective, links the communicative 
understanding of rationality to the exercise of democracy at all level of the 
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realization of human society.
84
 Nevertheless, the description of legitimacy that is 
given by Kumm – as one of the more committed supporters of cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism from the standpoint of legal theory – is by far less ambitious 
than the perspectives sketched by political philosophers. In particular, Kumm 
separates legitimacy from the praxis of democracy, i.e. from the direct or indirect 
but always explicit involvement of all those concerned, and regards legitimacy as 
guaranteed, in cosmopolitan perspective, if standards of “public reasonableness” 
are respected.
85
 In general, active involvement by the citizens could be 
substituted, in order to attain legitimacy within the cosmopolitan horizon, by the 
safeguard of fundamental rights as the main content of public reasonableness.
86
 
Yet, it remains rather unclear how the centrality “of the free and equal” could be 
preserved in front of such a concession to that kind of technocratic paternalism 
that colonizes a large part of the debate on governance beyond the nation state – 
and evidently influences also those authors who, like Kumm, are in other respects 
quite sensitive to the normative dimension that links cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism to the tenets of the communicative rationality.
87
 Furthermore, it 
is always difficult to ascertain who the legitimate holders and guardians of public 
reasonableness should be – if not those citizens or, in general, fellow humans who 
are affected by the consequences of the decision. As a result, it is not by chance 
that some philosophers and political scientists, when it comes to a coherent 
defence of the highest standards of legitimacy also within the international 
context, do not refrain from entering the difficult terrain of cosmopolitan 
democracy.
88
 
 
As it becomes evident in the debate on legitimacy and democracy in cosmopolitan 
perspective, laying down the epistemological premises of a conception that 
recognizes diversity, but maintains the centrality of a universal understanding of 
rationality, is just the first step – albeit a crucial one – on a quite long journey. For 
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a convincing translation of these premises into an applicable and useful theory of 
the legal system much work has yet to be done. 
 
 
